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TWO NEW YORK TAX CASES 
Joel S. Newman* 
Benjamin Cardozo wrote a number of opinions on New York 
State tax issues while he was on the Court of Appeals.  I have chosen 
two, which might be of interest to a modern tax lawyer.  They are 
People ex rel. Studebaker Corp. v. Gilchrist,1 an early transfer pricing 
case, and People ex. rel. Clark v. Gilchrist,2 a case involving the 
income taxation of stock dividends, when distributed to trust 
beneficiaries.   
I. STUDEBAKER 
A. Federal Transfer Pricing and Interstate Allocation of 
Income 
In the late 1950s, Du Pont formed a wholly-owned Swiss sales 
subsidiary, DISA, to market elastomers, which were some of its most 
profitable products.3  Switzerland was, at the time, a tax haven.  Du 
Pont’s intention was to shift as much of its profits as possible to the 
Swiss subsidiary.   The scheme was to have DISA sell the products to 
Du Pont at such a high price that DISA would be taxable on 75% of 
the profits, leaving only 25% taxable to Du Pont.4  A Du Pont official 
actually conceded that “he would have set prices so as to shift 99 
 
*Professor Emeritus, Wake Forest Law School.  A.B. Brown, 1968;  J.D. Chicago, 
1971. Professor Newman woud like to thank Ralph B. Tower, CPA, Ph. D., for  his 
help. 
1 155 N.E. 68 (N.Y. 1926). 
2 153 N.E. 39 (N.Y. 1926). 
3 E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 608 F.2d 445 (Ct. Cl. 1979). 
4 Id. at 448. For example, if DISA’s basis per unit of elastomers was zero, and 
the retail price per unit was $100, then DISA would sell each unit to Du Pont for 
$75.  Therefore, of the total profit per unit of $100, DISA would be taxed on $75 
(at the low or nonexistent Swiss tax rates), while Du Pont would be taxed on the 
remaining $25. In this example, the “transfer price” would have been $75. 
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percent of total profits to DISA if he had thought such an allocation 
would have survived IRS scrutiny.”5  Du Pont’s scheme failed.6 
Du Pont was a relatively early example of a transfer pricing 
scheme.  These schemes have been the bane of international tax 
authorities ever since.7  However, these issues have been around for a 
long time in state taxation of multistate enterprises.  If an American 
corporation does business in multiple states, then there is a huge 
incentive to shift corporate income away from a high-tax state to a low-
tax or even no-tax state.  This issue was faced by the New York Court 
of Appeals in the Studebaker case in 1926. 
In the 1920s, some states had corporate franchise taxes, but 
most did not.  The scheme was clear enough: 
The fact that only a smattering of states impose such 
taxes had encouraged several companies whose 
activities were split among taxing and non-taxing states 
to set up separate manufacturing and sales corporation, 
financially interdependent but legally autonomous, and 
so deprive a taxing state of the power to levy upon the 
profits thus isolated to one of the processes of a single 
business.8 
And that is exactly what Studebaker did.   
B. Studebaker:  The Facts 
Studebaker Corporation (“Parent”) was a New Jersey 
corporation,9 which manufactured automobiles in Indiana and 
Michigan.  The early 1920s were the “golden years” for Studebaker.10  
In 1921, it broke its own record, selling 66,643 automobiles.11  In 1923, 
 
5 Id. at 448 n.7. 
6 Id. at 448.  
7 See I.R.C. § 482 (2017) and accompanying, voluminous regulations. 
8 Case Comment, Interstate Allocation of Corporate Income for Taxing Purposes, 
40 YALE L. J. 1273 (1931). 
9 The company was originally incorporated in Indiana.  It was reincorporated in 
New Jersey in 1911.  THOMAS E. BONSALL, MORE THAN THEY PROMISED:  THE 
STUDEBAKER STORY (2000).   
10 DONALD T. CRITCHLOW, STUDEBAKER:  THE LIFE AND DEATH OF AN AMERICAN 
CORPORATION 89 (1996). 
11 BONSALL, supra note 9, at 113. For more on the Studebaker Corporation and 
automobiles, see the Studebaker Museum website, STUDEBAKER NATIONAL 
MUSEUM, https://studebakermuseum.org (last visited Feb. 4, 2018).  
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it reached its highest point, selling 145,167 vehicles.12  It completed its 
acquisition of Pierce-Arrow in 1928.13    
Parent established sales subsidiaries, including Studebaker 
Sales Corporation of Ohio, Studebaker Brothers of Utah, Studebaker 
Bros. of California, and Studebaker Corporation of America, a New 
Jersey corporation which sold automobiles and automobile accessories 
in New York and elsewhere (“NJ Sales”).14  On August 25, 1920, 
Parent and NJ Sales executed a sales agreement.15  Parent would sell 
NJ Sales automobiles at a discount of 25% off retail price, and 
automobile parts at a 33 1/3% discount.  NJ Sales would then resell the 
automobiles and parts in New York and elsewhere.  The discounts, 
however, were insufficient to allow NJ Sales to make a profit.  In 1920, 
it lost $449,133.14, while Parent made a net profit of $11,434,954.41.16  
As luck would have it, all of the other sales subsidiaries, except for the 
Ohio subsidiary, also lost money in that year.17  In 1921, NJ Sales lost 
$2,168,178.63, while Parent made $13,684,952.73.18 
    
 
 
The following colloquy occurred at the Tax Commission Hearing: 
 
Commissioner Merrill:  The business of the Studebaker Corporation 
during the two years in question [1921 and 1922] and at the close of those 
two years was the most remunerative that the company ever had, wasn’t 
it? 
 
Mr. Gulesian [accountant for Studebaker]: I do not know; there is no 
question but what it was remunerative, but whether it was the most 
remunerative of their existence I am not prepared to say. 
Case on Appeal, Return Exhibit V, at 55, People ex rel Studebaker Corp. v. Gilchrist, 
244 N.Y. 114 (1926) [hereinafter “Hearing”].  
12 BONSALL, supra note 9, at 116.  
13 BONSALL, supra note 9, at 141. 
14 Studebaker, 155 N.E. at 69. 
15 Case on Appeal, Return Exhibit VI, People ex rel Studebaker Corp. v. Gilchrist, 
244 N.Y. 114 (1926). 
16 Studebaker, 155 N.E. at 69. 
17 Id.  
18 Id.  Recall that, in Du Pont, the taxpayer attempted to shift 75% of the profits to 
the Swiss subsidiary.  They did not do any more than that, for fear that they wouldn’t 
get away with it.  Studebaker, by contrast, arranged for most of its sales subsidiaries 
to realize a loss. Thus, they were shifting 100% of the profits, and then some. See 
supra note 4.  
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At a hearing on the New York state tax dispute, Commissioner 
Merrill commented: 
It is pretty evident from the fact that the Studebaker 
Corporation of America [NJ Sales Corporation] 
reported the net loss to New York State of $449,133.14, 
that the contractural (sic) relation was such that there 
could not have been a profit to the Studebaker 
Corporation [NJ Sales Corporation] under the 
contract?19 
Mr. Gulesian, accountant for both parent and NJ Sales Corporation, 
answered: 
I am not prepared to answer that question; there was a 
reduction in retail price in the amount the New York 
Company paid for the cars; that may have been due to 
overhead or additional selling expenses, advertising or 
like reasons.20 
The State of New York was unimpressed.  It levied a tax on NJ Sales 
Corporation of $9,398.66 and $11,936.24, for the two tax years.21  It 
arrived at these figures by making an assets to assets comparison: 
These figures were arrived at by taking such a 
proportion of the combined net income of the parent 
corporation and its subsidiaries as the total 
determinative assets of those corporations bore to the 
determinative assets of those corporations allocated to 
the state of New York.22    
C. Appellate Division 
The Appellate Division sided with the State Tax Commission: 
“The question presented is whether our statute under which these taxes 
were assessed is sufficiently broad to frustrate this plan, obviously 
devised for the purpose of evading this income tax. . . . We think that 
it is.”23  Essentially, the Appellate Division found that the August 1920 
 
19 Hearing, supra note 11, at 53.  
20 Hearing, supra note 11, at 53. 
21 Studebaker, 155 N.E. at 69. 
22 People ex rel. Studebaker Corporation of America v. Gilchrist, 216 N.Y.S. 208, 
214 (App. Div. 1926) (Kellogg, J., dissenting). 
23 Id. at 210. 
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agreement was unfair, and would not have been reached by parties 
dealing with one another at arm’s length.  The court’s task, then, was 
to “determine the amount of net income which the relator would have 
received from its New York business under a fair agreement with its 
parent company.”24  Having done so, the burden was on the taxpayer 
to show that the tax was incorrectly assessed.25  They failed to meet 
this burden. Judge Kellogg dissented, arguing that the assets 
comparison accepted by the majority was not a method of allocation 
authorized by the statute.26 
 
D. The Court of Appeals 
 
The Court of Appeals reversed.27  Judge Cardozo set out the 
relevant statute: 
Where any corporation liable to taxation under this 
article conducts the business whether under agreement 
or otherwise in such manner as either directly or 
indirectly to benefit the members or stockholders of the 
corporation, or any of them, or any person or persons, 
directly or indirectly interested in such business by 
selling its products or the goods or commodities in 
which it deals at less than a fair price which might be 
obtained therefor, or where such a corporation, a 
substantial portion of whose capital stock is owned 
either directly or indirectly by another corporation, 
acquires and disposes of the products of the corporation 
so owning the substantial portion of its capital stock in 
such a manner as to create a loss or improper net 
income, the tax commission may require such facts as 
it deems necessary for the proper computation provided 
by this article, and may for the purpose of the act 
determine the amount which shall be deemed to be the 
entire net income of the business of such corporation 
for the calendar or fiscal year, and in determining such 
entire net income the tax commission shall have regard 
 
24 Id. at 212. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 213 (Kellogg, J., dissenting). 
27 Studebaker, 155 N.E. at 68. 
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to the fair profits which, but for any agreement, 
arrangement or understanding, might be or could have 
been obtained from dealing in such products, goods or 
commodities.28 
Cardozo wrote: 
We think the inference is permissible that loss would 
have been avoided if a contract fair and reasonable in 
its terms, such as would naturally have existed between 
independent corporations, had been made between 
independent corporations, had been made between   the 
subsidiary as the agent and the parent as the 
principal. . . . If the parties had been dealing upon a 
normal business footing, the discount would have been 
large enough to allow the selling agent a fair or 
customary commission upon the sales effected by the 
agency. There would have been little difficulty, one 
would suppose, in placing evidence in the record from 
which a conclusion could be drawn as to the extent of 
such commissions and the fair profits that would have 
been earned if such commissions had been paid and a 
reasonable return allowed on capital invested.  Nothing 
of the kind was proved.29 
Cardozo’s problem was that, under the asset allocation method 
used by the court below, all of the income attributable to New York—
not just some of it—was taxable by New York.  In effect, 100% of the 
New York income was allocated to NJ Sales Corporation. “We find no 
basis for a holding that a fair agreement between the parent which 
manufactured and the subsidiary which sold would have given the 
whole profit to the subsidiary and nothing to the parent.”30  The Court 
of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, and the proceeding was, 
“remitted to the Commission for the revision of the taxes in accordance 
with this opinion.”31   
Judge Crane, dissenting, agreed with the court below.  Since it 
was the taxpayer who created the fictitious loss, all that the Tax 
 
28 Tax Law, as amended by L. 1922, c. 507, § 211 subd. 9, quoted in Studebaker, 
155 N.E. at 69.  
29 Studebaker, 155 N.E. at 70. 
30 Id. at 70-71. 
31 Id. at 72. 
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Commission could do was to make a reasonable effort at a just 
allocation.  The burden then shifted to the taxpayer to prove them 
wrong.32 
Judge Cardozo made it very clear that the Court of Appeals 
would have been willing to consider piercing the corporate veil—
disregarding the subsidiary—if the Tax Commission had asked it to.  
But the Commission did not ask.   
We do not now inquire whether the State of New York 
might disregard the subsidiary as a mere cover or 
pretense and lay a tax upon the parent as upon a 
corporation doing business here through the 
instrumentality of an agent.  [citations omitted] If this 
or something not unlike might have been done, the 
Commission has not sought to do it.33 
In any event, for Cardozo, the crucial inquiry, had the issue 
been raised, would be directed toward the subsidiary’s autonomy. 
“Before the ‘corporation persona’ may be ignored, the evidence must 
show that ‘the subsidiary is not left with any autonomy.’”34 
 
32 Id. at 73-74 (Crane, J., dissenting). 
What were the taxing authorities here in the State of New York 
going to do? 
* * * 
I know of nothing in the law which prevents the Tax Commission 
from adopting this method of allocation in order to determine the 
net profits when other information is not forthcoming and it is 
conceded that the books do not correctly show the actual facts. 
* * * 
What is prescribed, however, is that the Tax Commission must find 
what the net profit was or would be, if any, under normal 
conditions on such business done in New York State.  To arrive at 
such a conclusion the Tax Commission could adopt and use any 
information it had, and this is specifically stated.   
33 Id. at 70.  Cardozo made this comment as part of his ruling that the first 
paragraph of subdivision 9 of section 211 did not apply.  According to Cardozo, the 
first paragraph applied only when the parent and the subsidiary were subject to the 
New York franchise tax. 
34 Studebaker, 155 N.E. at 71 (citing Learned Hand, J., in Procter & Gamble Co. 
v. Newton, 289 F. 1013, 1015 (1923)) (emphasis added).  Judge Cardozo’s opinion 
was cited for this proposition in Roswell Magill, Allocation of Income by Corporate 
Contract, 44 HARV. L. REV. 935, 943 n.41 (1931); and Case Note, What is Unitary 
Organization, 41 HARV. L. REV. 227, 231 n.27 (1927).  
7
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Thus, Cardozo was inviting the Tax Commission in subsequent 
cases to pierce the corporate veil, as long as it could be shown that the 
sales subsidiary had no autonomy.  Ultimately, Cardozo was not 
rejecting the reallocation; he was simply objecting to the 
computational method used by the Commission.  Yet, this decision was 
clearly a victory for the taxpayer.  It was, perhaps, not inappropriate 
for commentators to note that, in cases like Studebaker, Cardozo 
“joined the conservative wing of the court in decisions favoring 
business interests through what appears to be highly formalistic 
reasoning.”35 
Subsequent early decisions tended to view things Cardozo’s 
way—open to a different result in the case of egregious abuse, but 
reluctant to find it.  In Fox Film Corp. v. Loughman,36 responding to 
the Commission’s argument that the corporate arrangement was a 
subterfuge, the court responded: 
This contention is not tenable, for the evidence does not 
establish any misrepresentation or suppression as to 
facts.  There is nothing fictitious as to the apparent 
situation; the status is one created pursuant to and 
authorized by law, and the realty corporation must be 
recognized as a separate legal entity distinction from 
that of the petitioner.37 
Similarly, in Wisconsin, the court refused to reallocate income.  
Cardozo’s opinion in Studebaker was quoted at length.38 
Yet, in a much more recent New York case, income was 
reallocated.  However, in that case, there was a finding that no separate 
autonomy existed.   Therefore, the precise condition stated by Cardozo 
for piercing the corporate veil had been met.39   
 
35 Mark Gergen & Kevin Quinn, Common Law Judicial Decision Making: The 
Case of the New York Court of Appeals 1900-1941, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 897, 966 
(2012). 
36 251 N.Y.S. 693 (App. Div. 1931). 
37 Id. at 696 (citing Studebaker, 155 N.E. at 68).  
38 Curtis Companies, Inc. v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, 251 N.W. 497, 501 (Wis. 
1933). 
39 Wurlitzer Co. v. State Tax Commission, 42 A.D.2d 247 (App. Div. 1973), aff’d, 
315 N.E.2d 805 (N.Y. 1974): 
The key finding made by the Commission, which is dispositive of 
the case, is that WAC had no separate corporate autonomy and 
was, in reality, merely the finance department of a unitary 
8
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What is curious about the Studebaker decision is the method of 
allocation.  To an international tax lawyer, the facts screamed out for 
transfer price analysis.  To consider just the automobiles, NJ Sales’ 
discount was 25%.  For example, if the retail price of an automobile 
had been $100, then Parent would have sold it to NJ Sales for $75.  
From the perspective of NJ Sales, the resale transaction would be: 
Retail Price                                     $100 
--Basis[“transfer price”]                   $75 
--NJ Sales expenses per unit          [$25+] 
                                                                     (loss)40 
The question should have been whether the transfer price of $75 was 
too high. 
In a modern international tax case, the resale price method 
would be the most likely method of determining the transfer price.   
The resale price method evaluates whether the amount 
charged in a controlled transaction is arm’s length by 
reference to the gross profit margin realized in 
comparable uncontrolled transactions.  The resale price 
method is . . . ordinarily used in cases involving the 
purchase and resale of tangible property in which the 
reseller has not added substantial value to the tangible 
goods by physically altering the goods before resale.41 
When Cardozo sought to know the “fair or customary commission 
upon the sales effected by the agency,”42  he was seeking to know 
precisely what the gross profit margin would have been, had Parent 
 
business, Wurlitzer. WAC had no separate directors, officers or 
employees—all these positions were held by Wurlitzer personnel 
in addition to their regular duties; Wurlitzer personnel performed 
all of WAC’s business activity; WAC owned no separate real or 
tangible personal property. Thus, it is quite clear that, except for 
the fiction of a separate corporate shell, WAC is the same as the 
other unincorporated divisions of Wurlitzer; it, therefore, is for all 
intent and purposes the sixth division of the company.   
Wurlitzer Co., 42 A.D.2d at 250-51. 
40 Note that transfer pricing can shift income in either direction.  In Studebaker, 
the income was shifted to the parent, while in Du Pont, the income was shifted to the 
subsidiary.  
41 26 C.F.R. § 1.482(3)(c)(1) (2018). To compute the transfer price, reduce the 
retail price by the gross profit margin. 
42 Studebaker, 155 N.E. at 70. 
9
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and NJ Sales dealt with one another at arm’s length.   That is the resale 
price method.  This information, to the frustration of both Cardozo and 
the Appellate Division, was not provided by the taxpayer. 
The court below, having raised the transfer pricing issue, 
despaired of answering it.  Instead, they simply made an allocation of 
profits by comparing New York assets with world-wide assets.43                    
The Appellate Division was using what is now called the formulary 
apportionment method. Although the Appellate Division only 
compared assets to assets, the modern formulary apportionment 
method uses a weighted average of factors—usually including sales, 
payroll, and property, in order to allocate the worldwide income to 
each of the taxing jurisdictions.  This method, rejected in Studebaker, 
has since become the predominant method of allocating income among 
the states of the United States, even in New York.44   
Studebaker represents an early transfer pricing case, one in 
which a transfer pricing analysis might have been more easily applied 
than the formulary apportionment used by the Tax Commission and 
the Appellate Division. Judge Cardozo’s opinion was typical of                   
other pro-business opinions of the time. Curiously, the formulary 
apportionment which was so troubling for Cardozo has now won the 
day in state taxation. 
II. CLARK 
A. Stock Dividends as Taxable Income; Stock Dividends 
as Fiduciary Accounting Income 
When one thinks of dividends, one usually thinks of cash 
dividends.  The corporation distributes some of its earnings and profits 
to its shareholders in cash—so many dollars per share.  But then there 
are stock dividends. Instead of distributing cash, the corporation 
 
43 Id. at 73 (Crane, J., dissenting).  See also Studebaker, 216 N.Y.S. at 210. 
44 Matter of Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. Tax Appeals Trib. of State of N.Y., 10 
N.Y.3d 392 (2008).  See N.Y. TAX LAW § 210-A (Franchise Tax on Business 
Corporations: Apportionment). See also Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board 
of California, 512 U.S. 298 (1994). In theory, either transfer pricing or formulary 
apportionment should work equally well. In practice, formulary apportionment 
works less well in the international context, because such factors as payroll and 
property values can be so starkly different in first and third world countries. There 
are, admittedly, differences in payroll and property values in the various states of the 
United States, but they are not so extreme. 
10
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distributes its own stock.  For example, the corporation distributes one 
share of its own stock, for each ten shares already owned by the 
shareholder. 
Are dividends income? With cash dividends, the answer is 
easy.  Of course they are.45   However, with stock dividends, the answer 
is more complex.  With a cash dividend, the shareholder can spend the 
cash, immediately.  With stock dividends, in order to realize the benefit 
of the dividend, the shareholder must first sell the extra stock, and then 
spend it.  So, are stock dividends immediately income, or are they more 
like unrealized appreciation, taxable only upon a later realization 
event? 
But wait. There’s more. Income has different meanings for 
different purposes.  First, there is tax.  One cannot have an income tax 
unless one knows what income is.  A receipt is taxable income only if 
that receipt was income in the first place.  Are stock dividends taxable 
income? 
Then there is fiduciary accounting.  What is income, and what 
is principal, for fiduciary accounting purposes?  Imagine a trust which 
provides that income is payable annually to the Income Beneficiary 
(“IB”) for life, with the remainder payable upon IB’s death to the 
Remainderman (“R”).  This year, the trust receives some payments.  
The Trustee, in order to administer the trust properly, must determine 
which of those payments are income, and which are principal.  Income 
payments, such as interest and rent,46  should be distributed this year 
to IB.  In contrast, principal payments, such as most sales proceeds,47  
must be accumulated, to be paid out to R upon the death of IB.                      
Are stock dividends income, or principal? 
1. Stock Dividends as Taxable Income 
The tax question came up in the United States Supreme Court 
in the famous case of Eisner v. Macomber.48  Mrs. Macomber owned 
shares in Standard Oil of California.49  She received a dividend of one 
share of stock for every two shares already owned.50  Although the 
 
45 See I.R.C. § 61(a)(7) (2017).  
46 Uniform Principal and Income Act, § 401(b) (1997). 
47 Uniform Principal and Income Act, § 404(2) (1997). 
48 Eisner v. Macomber, 40 S. Ct. 189 (1920). 
49 Id. at 191.  
50 Id. 
11
Newman: Two New York Tax Cases
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2018
312 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 34 
1913 tax law did not mention stock dividends, the 1916 tax                  
statute specifically provided that they were taxable income.51  Mrs.       
Macomber argued that it was unconstitutional to tax her stock 
dividends as income.52  The Court agreed, in a five to four decision.  It 
held that stock dividends were not income.53  Therefore, if they were 
to be taxed, they could not be taxed under the Sixteenth Amendment.  
They could only be taxed under Article I, Section 8, in which case, the 
tax would have to be apportioned among the states.  The essence of 
income, according to the majority opinion, was that it must be derived 
from capital, and separated from that capital.54  There was no such 
separation in the form of a stock dividend. 
Eisner v. Macomber was very big news in 1920.  A significant 
amount of federal tax revenue was at stake.  The financial markets were 
in disarray for months before the decision was announced, because no 
one knew how stock dividends would be treated for tax purposes.55    
As it turned out, Eisner v. Macomber, though still famous, is no longer 
good law.  The Supreme Court came up with a much more workable 
definition of income in Glenshaw Glass,56 and the taxability of stock 
dividends is now addressed in I.R.C. § 305, in all of its complexity.   
But Macomber’s case was a very big deal at the time. 
2. Stock Dividends as Fiduciary Accounting Income 
The fiduciary accounting question has its own complications.   
The share of stock is the principal—the asset which generates the 
income.  The dividend on that stock, if in cash, is clearly income 
generated by that principal.  However, a stock dividend—perhaps 
splitting one share of stock into two shares—would appear to be a mere 
reconstitution of the principal stock.  It is hard to see how a splitting of 
the principal into smaller pieces can turn that principal into income.    
Yet, at the time of the stock dividend in Clark, New York 




53 Macomber, 40 S. Ct. at 195.  
54 Id. 
55 Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Story of Macomber: The Continuing Legacy of 
Realization, in PAUL CARON, TAX STORIES 93 (2d ed., 2009).  
56 Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass. Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955). 
57 Jesse Raymond, Trusts—Division of Extraordinary Dividends Between Cestuis 
For Life and In Remainder, 10 TEX. L. REV. 75, 82 n.22 (1931). 
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dividends were treated as income, but only if payable from the 
accumulated earnings of the corporation.  Otherwise, they were treated 
as principal, and accumulated for the benefit of the R.   In this way, the 
integrity of the corpus was preserved.58 
Assume that a corporation has earnings.  If it pays them out as 
cash dividends this year, they should be fiduciary accounting income, 
payable to IB.  If the corporation accumulates those earnings and pays 
them out in some subsequent year, should they not still be income?   In 
fact, shouldn’t they be fiduciary accounting income whether they are 
paid out as cash dividends or stock dividends?   That was the position 
taken by the Pennsylvania Rule.  Pursuant to this Rule, it can often be 
the case that stock dividends are principal for fiduciary accounting 
purposes but income for tax purposes.   
So, in 1926, stock dividends were not taxable income under the 
federal income tax, pursuant to Eisner v. Macomber.  They were, 
however, sometimes fiduciary accounting income, pursuant to the 
Pennsylvania Rule, then adopted in New York.   These two notions 
came together in Clark. 
B. The Case: Facts 
Alfred Corning Clark’s father was the partner of Isaac Singer, 
of the Singer Sewing Machine Company.59  Alfred Corning Clark put 
a substantial amount of the stock of the Singer Sewing Machine 
Company in trust, for his son, Robert Sterling Clark, for life.60  In 1920, 
the Singer Sewing Machine Company declared a stock dividend.  As a 
result, 10,642 shares of Singer Stock were payable to the Trust.61  The 
Trustees duly distributed those shares to Robert Sterling Clark, the life 
tenant.62  The issue was the taxability of those shares.   
 
58 Case Note, Interpretation of Deed of Trust: Distinction between stock dividends 
and dividends of stock, 43 YALE L.J. 1181 (1934); Case Note, Conflicting Claims of 
Life Tenant and Remainderman to “All Stock—No Cash” Dividends, 46 HARV. L. 
REV. 298 (1932); Raymond, supra note 57.  
59 See generally NICHOLAS WEBER, THE CLARKS OF COOPERSTOWN:  THEIR 
SINGER SEWING MACHINE FORTUNE, THEIR GREAT AND INFLUENTIAL ART 
COLLECTIONS (2007). 
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C. Authorities 
The Macomber case was cited both by the Appellate Division 
and the Court of Appeals.  In the Court of Appeals, Judge Cardozo 
commented: “The Income Tax Law of New York is framed upon the 
model of the Federal Income Tax Act, though the two differ in some 
particulars.  The correspondence is so close, however, that decisions 
under the Federal Act are important aids to the construction of the 
statute of the State.”63  Recall that Macomber held that stock dividends 
were not income.64 
There was also the Opinion of the New York Attorney General, 
which stated that stock dividends, subject to exceptions not relevant to 
this case, were not income.65   This Attorney General’s opinion was 
accepted by Article 61 of the state regulations.66  These regulations had 
remained in place unchallenged for some years.  Things looked good 
for the taxpayer. 
There was, however, the statute.  Section 359 of the New York 
tax law (the “1919 Statute”) stated that dividends were taxable.67  
Subdivision 8 of Section 359 went on to say that stock dividends were 
dividends.68   
D. The Appellate Division 
For the Appellate Division, the statute was enough.  The 
Macomber ruling was crucially important under federal law, when the 
 
63 Id. 
64 Macomber, 40 S. Ct. at 195.  Charles Evans Hughes had a curious and continuing 
relationship with these cases.  He wrote the opinion in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 
418 (1918), which paved the way for the Macomber decision.  After resigning from 
the Supreme Court in order to run for President, he represented the taxpayer in 
Macomber.  Kornhauser, supra note 55, at 100. When Clark was argued in the New 
York Court of Appeals, Hughes joined in an amicus brief.  Br. of Murray, Aldrich & 
Roberts and Hughes, Rounds, Schurman & Dwight, as Amici Curiae, from records 
and briefs for People ex rel. Clark v Gilchrist.  Not surprisingly, Hughes would have 
liked the New York Court of Appeals to have shown even more deference to 
Macomber.  The brief quoted the opinion of Hughes, J., in Towne v. Eisner. 
65 Clark, 153 N.E. at 40. 
66 Id. 
67 Laws 1919, c. 627, § 359 subd. 1, cited in People ex rel Clark v. Gilchrist, 211 
N.Y.S. 679, 679 (App. Div. 1925). 
68 Laws 1919, c. 627, § 359 subd. 8, cited in People ex rel Clark v. Gilchrist, 211 
N.Y.S. 679, 679 (App. Div. 1925). 
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applicability of the Sixteenth Amendment was in play.  But there was 
no counterpart to the Sixteenth Amendment in New York.  Perhaps, 
said the Appellate Division, the use of the word “income” was a 
“misnomer” when applied to stock dividends.69  But it did not matter, 
because the New York State taxing power was not limited to income.  
The New York legislature had explicitly stated that stock dividends 
were taxable, and so they were.  The State Tax Commission argued 
that the court should distinguish the case of stock dividends received 
by shareholders, and stock dividends received by trust beneficiaries.  
However, the Appellate Division pointed out that there was no such 
distinction in the statute.  The taxpayer lost.70 
E. The Court of Appeals 
On appeal, Judge Cardozo also paid homage to the U.S. 
Supreme Court decision in Macomber, but again pointed out that 
Macomber, with its constitutional dimension, was distinguishable.   
When the issue came before the Court of Appeals, however, there were 
new state statutes in play.  In 1926, the New York State legislature, 
presumably reacting to the Appellate Division decision in Clark, 
passed a new tax statute, retroactive to January 1, 1919 (the “1926 
Statute”).71  For the purpose of the new statute, “stock dividends” were 
“new stock issued, for surplus or profits capitalized, to shareholders in 
proportion to their previous holdings.”72  Such stock dividends were, 
pursuant to the 1926 Statute, not taxable to the recipient until the 
corporation redeemed or cancelled them, or the shareholder sold 
them.73   
Also, the 1926 Legislature amended the state Personal Property 
Law, providing that “under any will or deed hereafter made, unless 
 
69 Clark, 211 N.Y.S. at 681. 
70 Id. at 682. 
71 Judge Cardozo ruled that there was no constitutional problem with the 
retroactivity of the 1926 Statute.  Clark, 153 N.E. at 42. 
72  L. 1926, ch. 543, § 1. 
73  L. 1926, ch. 543, § 2, quoted in Clark, 153 N.E. at 41: 
Stock dividends when received by a shareholder shall not be subject to tax 
but if before or after the distribution of any such dividend the corporation 
proceeds to cancel or redeem its stock at such time and in such manner as 
to make the distribution and cancellation or redemption in whole or in part 
essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend, the amount 
so distributed in redemption or cancellation of the stock shall be treated as 
a taxable dividend and included in gross income.  
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otherwise therein provided, stock dividends shall be principal and not 
income of a trust.”74  Thus, the 1926 Legislature prospectively 
abandoned the Pennsylvania Rule. 
The Attorney General again argued that the new statute should 
not apply when the stock dividend was paid to a trust beneficiary, 
rather than directly to a shareholder—especially when the stock 
dividends were actually paid to the life beneficiary, and hence, treated 
by the Trustee as income.75  Again, no such distinction had been raised 
in the new statute. 
In fact, the Legislature had considered making such a 
distinction in 1926, but rejected it.  An earlier draft of the bill contained 
the following: “Where a stock dividend is received by a fiduciary 
shareholder, and is paid under a will, deed of trust, or other agreement, 
to a beneficiary taxable under this article, it shall constitute taxable 
income and be included by the beneficiary in gross income for the year 
of its receipt.”76 This language was dropped from the legislation as 
enacted.77 
Judge Cardozo also took note of the change in the Personal 
Property Law. In his view, the Pennsylvania Rule had been 
appropriately rejected because: 
The rule previously applied had resulted in so                        
many complications and obscurities as to be                         
almost unworkable in practice. It involved elaborate 
accountings for the purpose of determining how far 
the dividends were the result of profits accumulated 
before the creation of the trust, and how far the result 
of profits accumulated thereafter. The Legislature 
evinced its will that there should be an end to these 
complexities hereafter in the administration of the 
law of trusts.  It had no thought of keeping them alive 
in the administration of the Tax Law.78 
 
74 L. 192, Pers. Prop. Law, § 17-a, cited in Clark, 153 N.E. at 41. 
75 Clark, 153 N.E. at 41. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. (internal citations omitted). Cardozo’s linking of the two 1926 changes might 
suggest that he thought that the change to the Personal Property Law, as well as the 
change to the tax laws, was retroactive.  The change to the Personal Property Law 
was not retroactive. In Pratt v. Ladd, 253 N.Y. 213 (1930), a unanimous decision 
joined by Judge Cardozo, the Pennsylvania Rule was applied to a stock dividend paid 
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Judge Cardozo had other administrative concerns as well.  
Recall that, pursuant to the Opinion of the Attorney General and the 
ensuing regulation, many recipients of stock dividends had omitted 
those receipts from their state tax returns.  Holding now that such stock 
dividends should have been taxable would create an administrative 
nightmare: 
There existed a situation fraught with opportunities for 
confusion and injustice. Returns had been made in 
reasonable reliance on the Comptroller’s regulation.  If 
there had been mistake, it was mistake induced by 
agents of the State itself. Taxpayers thus misled had 
regulated their affairs on the assumption that their tax 
accounts were closed.  To reaudit returns so made might 
impose a grievous burden.79 
Furthermore, Judge Cardozo pointed out that the taxation of the stock 
dividends was not being exempted, but merely deferred, until such 
time as the stock was cancelled, redeemed, or sold.  For Cardozo, the 
1926 Statute was clear.  The Appellate Division was reversed, and the 
taxpayer prevailed.80 
F. Who Was Right? 
Both the Appellate Division and the Court of Appeals were 
right in their ultimate holdings.  They reached opposite results, but the 
statute had changed in the meantime.  Perhaps, then, a more 
appropriate question would be which legislation was better—the 1919 
Statute, or the 1926 Statute? 
 
in 1925—despite the abandonment of the Pennsylvania Rule in 1926. See also 
Raymond, supra note 57, at 82 n.22 (“Trusts established prior to its [the 1926 
abandonment of the Pennsylvania Rule] enactment are apparently still governed by 
the Osborne case [the Pennsylvania Rule].”).  
79 Clark, 153 N.E. at 42. 
80 Id. at 43. Cardozo’s Clark opinion has stood the test of time rather well.  It is 
cited perhaps more often to support the notion that the state legislature can enact 
retroactive tax laws without violating constitutional norms. Yeaton v. Levitt,                    
244 N.Y.S.2d 334 (App. Div. 1963).  The ruling applies to “extraordinary stock 
dividends.”  In re Villard’s Will, 147 Misc. 472, 474 (Surr. Ct. Westchester Cty. N.Y. 
1933); Attorney General Jacob Javits, under somewhat different facts, wrote 
approvingly of Cardozo’s opinion in a 1955 Attorney General’s Opinion.  1955 Op. 
Atty Gen. No. 237.  
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Both statutes ignored the distinction between shareholder and 
trust beneficiary.  Ironically, when the statute favored the government 
in the Appellate Division, the taxpayer argued that the statute should 
not apply to trust beneficiaries.  Yet, when the revised statute favored 
the taxpayer in the Court of Appeals, it was the government making 
that argument. 
Both courts rejected the argument.  Both courts were correct, 
in that neither statute recognized the distinction between shareholder 
and beneficiary.  The Court of Appeals was on even firmer ground, 
since the legislature by that time had considered recognizing the 
distinction, but rejected it.  Were the two legislatures correct in 
ignoring this distinction? 
The fact that the recipient of the dividend was a trust 
beneficiary rather than a mere shareholder did indeed make a 
difference. For the shareholder, both cash dividends and stock 
dividends benefited the same recipient—the shareholder.  However, 
for trust beneficiaries, they might not have done so.  Cash dividends 
were clearly fiduciary accounting income, and therefore payable when 
received to IB.  However, under the Pennsylvania Rule in place in New 
York at the time, stock dividends might have been fiduciary 
accounting income, payable to IB, or they might have been fiduciary 
accounting principal, payable to R.   
Moreover, there was a timing difference. Cash dividends, 
whether payable to a shareholder or a trust beneficiary, were payable 
to IB when declared and paid by the corporation. However, stock 
dividends, under the Pennsylvania Rule, might have been payable to 
IB when declared and paid by the corporation, or, perhaps, they were 
not to be beneficially enjoyed until the expiration of the income 
interest.  And yet, both statutes treated all cash dividends the same, and 
all stock dividends the same. 
Once the Pennsylvania Rule was abandoned, the 1926 Statute 
made sense.81  Both the complexities of the taxation, and fiduciary 
accounting, were removed.  Perhaps fairness in all possible situations 
was not achieved, but administrability was.  Now, things are even 
clearer, for the State of New York has abandoned its own, separate 
income tax entirely, in favor of bootstrapping itself to the provisions 
 
81 The Pennsylvania Rule has since been abandoned in most states.  NORMAN LANE 
& HOWARD ZARITSKY, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF ESTATES AND TRUSTS ¶ 3.04 
(1988). 
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of the federal tax.  Now, at least, there is only one level of complexity, 
not two.82   
One cannot blame either the Appellate Division or the Court of 
Appeals for failing to achieve a fairer result in light of the difficulties 
caused by the differences between cash dividends and stock dividends, 
tax accounting and fiduciary accounting, and shareholders and trust 
beneficiaries.  The two courts merely applied the statutes as they were 
written.  One might have wished that the New York State legislature, 
both in 1919 and 1926, had been more keenly aware of the 
complexities it faced.  Yet, by abandoning the Pennsylvania Rule, and 
eventually abandoning even a separate New York State income tax 
system, the New York State legislature ultimately came up with 
something that works reasonably well. 
III. CONCLUSION 
One could design an entire three-year law school curriculum 
exclusively around Cardozo opinions. 
 
 
82 N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 607, 611 (McKinney 2018). For federal tax treatment, see 
I.R.C. § 643(a)(4) (2017).  Good luck. 
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